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The bourgeoisie confesses that. . . in order to save its purse 
it must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard 
it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword 
of Damocles. 
K. Marx, “Eighteenth Btumaire of Louis Bonaparte” 
2.1  Introduction 
In  1979, one of the oil boom  years, President L6pez  Portillo announced 
Mexico’s intention to adhere to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). In 1980, having engaged in consultations with major interest groups, 
he then reversed this decision. Under President de la Madrid (1982-88),  Mex- 
ico experienced several negative shocks, namely the collapse of the oil price 
and the interruption of foreign credit influx at a time when around 5% of the 
GDP was being used to service foreign debt. To make matters worse, the coun- 
try suffered one of  the severest earthquakes of  the century. Still, in  1985, in 
the midst of  this crisis, Mexico finally did accede to GATT. By  1987, it had 
transformed  itself from an extremely  closed economy  into one of  the most 
open ones in the world. And in 1993, it signed the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States. This transformation 
occurred notwithstanding the fact that trade liberalization implied significant 
adjustment costs for the private, import-competing  sector, and that the state- 
owned sector had seen its subsidies vanish. Nonetheless, the import-competing 
sector, which had opposed trade liberalization in  1979, did not oppose it in 
1985. It was curious that it should have been President de la Madrid, typically 
portrayed as weak and indecisive, who initiated the change, rather than Presi- 
dent L6pez Portillo, who tended to be seen as the strong leader. 
Following the liberalization of  trade, the  government  implemented  a far- 
reaching fiscal reform.  The majority  of  state-owned companies were privat- 
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ized, bringing their number down from 1,155 in 1982 to less than 220 in 1993; 
the income tax rate was reduced from 42% to 34% and tax compliance was 
enforced, resulting in increased tax collection; and government subsidies were 
significantly reduced. This reform changed the sign of the primary fiscal bal- 
ance from negative during the period 1970-82 to positive for each year of the 
period  1983-93.  It is worth noting that the reform took place in a context of 
deteriorating terms of trade. As can be seen in figure 2.1, the index fell around 
50% between 1981 and 1986. 
The Mexican experience raises the question of why the reforms were imple- 
mented at a time of economic crisis rather than at a time of bonanza, when the 
country might have been able to “afford” the short-term costs more easily. One 
may look at this puzzle in at least two ways. A first perspective would be that 
the government has the latitude to act as if it were a central planner who maxi- 
mizes some objective function and does not face any pressure from interest 
groups. According to this view,  in the Mexican case, Presidents Echevem’a 
(1970-76)  and L6pez Portillo (1976-82)  either did what they deemed best, or 
what was in fashion throughout the world at that particular time, while Presi- 
dents de la Madrid (1982-88)  and Salinas (1988-94)  decided to follow the 
reformist vogue of the eighties. For this perspective, the story ends here. 
By  contrast, the second view would be that governments do not act in a 
vacuum, but in a jungle of rent-seeking groups. In this view, economic policy 
ceases to be the design of a central planner and becomes the result of interac- 
tion by rent-seeking groups. Thus in order to understand changes in economic 
policy, we would have to analyze the gains and losses of each interest group. 
In all likelihood, the correct explanation is a combination of both these per- 
spectives. However, for the purpose of shedding some light on the aforemen- 
tioned puzzle, I will make the extreme contention that only interest-group in- 
teraction matters. That is, even  if  a government is concerned about social 
welfare, it will be able to implement structural reforms, such as trade liberal- 
ization, only if  it does not encounter opposition from interest groups that have 
the power to block the reform. 
In Mexico, the two major interest groups that blocked trade liberalization 
during the seventies were the import-competing, private sector elite and the 
state-owned companies (parastatal elite). Through the political process, these 
groups had almost unlimited access to fiscal revenue. They enjoyed subsidized 
inputs and profited from convoluted regulations and high trade barriers, which 
had the effect of increasing the profitability of the fixed factors in these sectors. 
Trade liberalization left both groups in a worse situation than the one they 
enjoyed under the status quo. Why is it, to reiterate the puzzle, that the private 
elite supported trade liberalization during bad times, even if  it preferred the 
status quo over trade liberalization? And why is it that it would not support 
trade liberalization during good times? 
The first point I make in this paper is that, when fiscal revenue was high in 
Mexico, subsidies to interest groups were high. Thus a “cohabitation equilib- 
rium” existed between these two groups, and both were unanimously blocking 55  Economic Crises: Necessary for Trade Liberalization, Fiscal Reform? 
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Fig. 2.1  Mexican terms of trade and fiscal balance 
Nores: The primary balance includes interest payments, while the financial balance excludes 
them. In both cases the revenue from privatization is excluded. 
trade liberalization.  However, when fiscal revenue plummeted, the cohabita- 
tion equilibrium broke down, as it became profitable for each group to under- 
take actions to diminish the power of the other group, and thus secure a greater 
share of  fiscal  revenue for itself. In other words,  previously  friendly  rivals 
switched to an attitude of  "if  I don't  shoot, he will shoot."  Support of  trade 
liberalization was one such action. 
As fiscal revenue collapsed in the early eighties, the parastatal elite took the 56  Aaron Tornell 
first action. It induced the expropriation of all private banks in 1982.  This move 
took everyone by surprise, and it was rumored that more expropriations were 
to follow. However, to the astonishment of many, the next move was trade liber- 
alization. This time trade liberalization was supported by the private elite even 
though it faced severe costs in terms of reallocation  of factors of production. 
It supported trade liberalization because the choice  for the private elite was not 
between the status quo and trade liberalization, as in the seventies, but between 
more expropriations and trade liberalization. 
Trade liberalization reduces the risk of further expropriation because it en- 
tails what one might call a “discipline effect.” This effect has two components, 
foreign and domestic. The foreign component derives from the fact that under 
free trade it is no longer easy for the government to expropriate, since it has to 
fear that foreigners will retaliate by withdrawing investment or erecting trade 
barriers. Moreover, international agreements such as NAFTA penalize the im- 
position of regulations that protect some sectors. Thus, when seeking protec- 
tion and subsidies, interest groups have  to face the potential retaliation from 
foreigners. The domestic component in turn has two aspects; first, free trade 
generates new strong groups, that is, exporters who have an interest in main- 
taining free trade. Second, under free trade, regulations become simpler and 
more transparent. The previous involved system of import licensing and multi- 
ple tariffs is replaced by a much more straightforward law mandating only one 
or two rates to be applied across all industries. These new rules expose rent- 
seeking behavior  by  individual  groups more  effectively.  As a result,  other 
groups may block it at inception. 
The second point of the paper is that, as the major interest groups had been 
weakened by their internecine struggles (which were reflected in bank expro- 
priation and trade liberalization), the governments of Presidents de la Madrid 
and Salinas achieved a temporary autonomy from the established elites. This 
enabled them to press on with further reforms that had been deemed impossi- 
ble just a few years back,  such as the privatization  of  the majority  of  state- 
owned  companies,  including the banks,  a radical deregulation process  that 
eliminated monopolistic rents on items ranging from jelly jars to ports, and a 
major tax reform. 
In sum, trade liberalization was supported by  the private elite in order to 
save itself from the parastatal elite. Under free trade, the parastatal elite has to 
face new interests: exporters and foreigners. However, free trade also limits 
the ability of the private elite to obtain monopoly rents. Referring to the quote 
from Marx’s “Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” we might say that in 
the Mexican case trade liberalization acted as the sword of Damocles. 
In order to make these points more precise, I present in section 2.3 a game- 
theoretic model that analyzes the interaction between the two interest groups. 
I explain why in good times trade liberalization is blocked unanimously by all 
powerful interest groups, and why in bad times this unanimity breaks down, 
with  some groups supporting trade liberalization, even if all groups end up 
worse off than under the status quo. 57  Economic Crises: Necessary for Trade Liberalization, Fiscal Reform? 
The model is based on the observation that each group has the potential to 
reduce the power of the second group by  temporarily using part of  its fixed 
factors in activities other than production. This entails a short-run cost in terms 
of forgone profits, and a long-term gain derived from a weaker second group. 
For example, consider the case of trade liberalization. When it is implemented, 
some of the fixed factors remain temporarily  idle because they have to be re- 
allocated.  Although  this  involves  a  short-term  loss,  the  future  power  of 
rent-seeking groups to expropriate will be reduced because of the discipline 
effect of trade liberalization. 
The cohabitation equilibrium breaks down when one group finds it profit- 
able to incur the short-run cost and displace the second group. If  in addition 
the payoff of  matching is greater than the payoff of staying put, the  second 
group will also incur the short-run cost and eliminate the power of the first 
group. In these circumstances, both groups lose their power, and reform might 
take place. I show that this occurs when fiscal revenues, and thus subsidies, 
are sufficiently  small. This is because the profitability  of  fixed factors goes 
down, making it less costly to have part of them idle during the short run, and 
raising the incentives to displace other groups and having access to a greater 
share  of  the  smaller  fiscal  revenue.  This  situation  is  similar  to the  game 
of  musical chairs. If there are two chairs for Helen  and Mary, they have no 
reason to fight even when  the music stops.  If  we remove a chair, however, 
Helen and Mary will  scream and fight for that chair even before the music 
stops. 
I would like to point out that this paper dues not suggest that the reforms 
that took place in Mexico would have happened  regardless  of  who was the 
president. The autonomy to act can be used in various ways, and the protago- 
nists as well as fashionable academic ideas will influence the course chosen. It 
might well be that if the government had been headed by persons other than 
de la Madrid and Salinas, they would have misused their temporary autonomy. 
What is clear, however, is that the  mutual  weakening of  the  major  interest 
groups gave the government the latitude to implement the reforms. 
Finally, a few words about how this paper relates to the literature. The model 
I present is a two-period version of a preemption game. These games are used 
in industrial organization to study the adoption of  a new technology or the 
introduction of a new product. Since such a move entails a cost, any firm would 
prefer to adopt as late as possible, provided the other firms also wait. However, 
since introducing the product first gives a monopolistic advantage, at some 
point in time each firm would find it optimal to preempt, if the other firms were 
waiting to adopt at a later date. Therefore, there might be early adoption even 
if it is against the interest of the industry as a whole. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) use a war-of-attrition model to analyze delays in 
stabilizations. In a war of attrition, the game ends when one player concedes, 
and as long as the war continues both groups incur a cost. In contrast to pre- 
emption games, in a war of attrition each player wants the game to end as soon 
as possible, and prefers the other to concede first. In the model of Alesina and 58  Aaron Tornell 
Drazen, delays occur because players are uncertain about the payoffs of the 
other players. By waiting they induce the weaker players to concede first. 
Femandez and Rodrik (1991) present a model where uncertainty regarding 
the probable winners and losers from reform leads to a bias toward the status 
quo. Thus reforms that would have been blocked might find support if  they 
could be implemented. 
Lastly, Velasco (1993) presents an argument along the same lines as mine 
to explain the reforms that took place in Chile during the  seventies. Unlike 
Mexico, in Chile it was not a drastic collapse in the terms of trade that induced 
the breakdown of the status quo, but rather “the arrival of several new guests 
at the dinner table of the distributive state” in the sixties. Among them were the 
traditional  urban labor movement, the shanty-town dwellers, and rural labor. 
However, the effect was the same as in Mexico: less available fiscal revenue 
for each group. This increased the incentives to incur the short-run costs neces- 
sary to eliminate the power of the other groups. The results were the wave of 
expropriations and strikes of  1970-73 and the trade liberalization of 1975. As 
established interest groups weakened one another, Pinochet acquired auton- 
omy to act as he saw fit. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2.2 I review the Mexican expe- 
rience in detail. In section 2.3 I present the model. In section 2.4 I analyze the 
role of politics. In section 2.5 I address the issue of whether the reforms should 
outlast the crisis that generated them. Lastly, in section 2.6 I present the conclu- 
sions. 
2.2  The Mexican Experience 
During the fifties and sixties, Mexico followed an import substitution policy 
and a tight fiscal policy. The economy experienced an extraordinary average 
GDP growth of almost 7% per year and annual inflation rates of less than 5%. 
However, industrialization had been attained by way of very protectionist trade 
policies and heavy regulation.’ By the end of the sixties, the emerging consen- 
sus held that the import substitution strategy had been exhausted and that a 
reform was needed. At the same time, there was mounting pressure from the 
left for a reduction in poverty and income inequality. 
In order to address these demands, the administration of  President Eche- 
vem’a  (1970-76)  Increased  the  emphasis  on  redistributive  policies  and  in- 
creased its involvement in production. Thus the administration started an ambi- 
tious  program of  building  state-owned  enterprises  in  sectors that had  been 
private in the past, such as steel. Increased government expenditures were not 
matched by higher taxes because opposition from the private  sector did not 
allow the government to implement a tax increase. As a result, the fiscal deficit 
1. For an analysis of the “Desarrollo Estabilizador,” see Ortiz Mena (1970). For an analysis of 
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increased from 4% of GDP in 1970 to 10% in 1976. This in turn led to higher 
inflation, higher foreign debt, and higher current account deficits. It is interest- 
ing to note that, prior to becoming president, Echevem’a  was the minister of 
the interior, and at that time he was considered an economic conservative. 
Echevem’a’s  six years ended with a depreciation of  the currency of  60%, 
tense relations between government and private sector, and the emergence of 
the parastatal elite as a strong new interest group. Indeed, this group had bene- 
fited the most from the new investment projects initiated by  the government. 
Unfortunately, contrary to expectations, indicators of income distribution had 
not improved.* It should be emphasized that, despite its antibusiness rhetoric, 
the Echevem’a  government did not introduce trade and fiscal reforms, even 
though these had been deemed necessary since the early seventies. 
When President L6pez Portillo took office in 1976, he tried to reestablish 
cordial relations with the private sector. Although in 1977 the government an- 
nounced intentions of a structural reform, and a fiscal contraction was begun, 
these plans were soon abandoned. This was due to the discovery of significant 
oil reserves and the increase in the price of oil. A free-for-all fiscal policy was 
implemented, meaning that the increase in the fiscal revenue was matched by 
a more than proportional increase in government expenditures. The investment 
program in government-owned enterprises was accelerated; prices of electric- 
ity, oil, and gas were heavily subsidized; and a very ambitious program to re- 
duce poverty was implemented. An indicator of the increase in fiscal transfers 
is the evolution of  expenditures of  the parastatal sector, which represented 
9.8% of GDP in 1970 and reached 22.2% in 1982. An indicator of the transfers 
to the private sector is the half-billion-dollar bailout in  1981 of  Gmpo Alfa, 
one of the biggest private companies in Mexico. As a result of these policies, 
the fiscal deficit jumped from 10% in GDP in 1977 to 17% in 1982. 
Since fiscal revenue was sufficient to give transfers to almost every group- 
to the parastatal and private elites, to the urban middle class and to the rural 
poor-it  is fair to say that every powerful group was satisfied with the status 
quo, and no incentive existed to implement the reforms contemplated since 
1970. That is, high subsidies led to high profitability of fixed factors owned by 
powerful groups. Therefore no group found it profitable to incur the short-run 
cost necessary to weaken the other groups, and secure for itself a greater share 
of future fiscal revenue. Hence in those years of bonanza, all powerful groups 
blocked reform. An example, mentioned in the introduction, is the 1979 presi- 
dential announcement of  Mexico’s intentions to adhere to GATT.  This plan 
generated criticism from the private and the parastatal elite, and in  1980 the 
decision not to accede to GATT was made public. It should be noted that, were 
one to embrace the central-planner view of policy making, another plausible 
explanation for this outcome is that the members of the economic cabinet did 
not consider free trade to be welfare improving. 
2. See Aspe and Beristain (1984). 60  Aaron Tornell 
The populist transfer policies had to be halted at the beginning of the eight- 
ies due to the fall in the price of oil and the interruption in foreign lending. As 
a result, fiscal resources were no longer sufficient to satisfy all interest groups. 
Thus there was an increase in the net payoff that a group could expect from 
inducing a change in the status quo. The first move was made by the parastatal 
elite. In September 1982, just three months before he left office, President L6- 
pez Portillo announced the expropriation of all the Mexican private banks dur- 
ing his last and very dramatic address to Congress. The bank  owners were 
considered one of the strongest groups within the private elite, and the banks 
an important conduit of fiscal revenue to the private sector (through subsidized 
credit and through implicit guarantees of their borrowings from foreign banks). 
The expropriation occurred simultaneously with the imposition of capital con- 
trols, and with the resignation of the orthodox governor of the Central Bank, 
Miguel Mancera. He was replaced by Carlos Tello, an economist with inter- 
ventionist ideas, who was close to Jost A. de Oteyza, the extremely influential 
minister of energy, mines, and parastatal industry. The reaction of the private 
sector representatives  was to call a national strike for September 8. However, 
on September 7, this strike was canceled. 
In the midst of this crisis, President de la Madrid took office in December 
1982. There were fears that under his tenure expropriations would continue 
and statism would increase, since after all he had been the minister of budget 
and planning during the administration of President L6pez Portillo. However, 
the opposite occurred. During his tenure, three important decisions were made: 
not to interrupt debt service to foreign banks, to open the economy by joining 
GATT in  1985, and to privatize the parastatal sector. Confirming the commit- 
ment to monetary austerity, Miguel Mancera was reappointed governor of the 
Central Bank (a position he holds until the present). 
Trade liberalization  was painful for the private sector. The puzzle is why it 
did not oppose trade liberalization this time around, given that it had opposed 
reform in the past. The argument of the paper is the following: The reversion 
of lending flows from inflows to outflows and the deterioration in the terms of 
trade resulted in a reduction in the fiscal revenue  available for rent-seeking 
groups. In  order to eliminate the access that the private sector had to fiscal 
revenues via subsidized credit, the parastatal elite decided to induce the expro- 
priation  of the banks. The private sector matched this move by incurring the 
adjustment costs associated with trade liberalization. Adherence to GATT and 
later to NAFTA had a double effect. First, it blocked the access of the parastatal 
group to fiscal revenues because these treaties required Mexico to deregulate 
and to eliminate the bulk of fiscal subsidies. Second, expropriation of private 
industries was more difficult in an open economy. In other words, the private 
elite did not oppose trade liberalization because its choice was not between 
trade liberalization and the  status quo, but between trade liberalization and 
becoming the follower. It chose the first because it thereby could weaken the 
parastatal elite and stop further expropriations. 61  Economic Crises: Necessary for Trade Liberalization, Fiscal Reform? 
The moves undertaken by the parastatal and the private elites were costly to 
these groups, and reduced their access to fiscal revenue. Indeed, it is very likely 
that for these groups (not for the economy as a whole) the status quo would 
have been more advantageous than the free trade regime, deregulation, and 
reduction in subsidies. The question is why  they nonetheless acted the way 
they did, given that they were rational and had perfect foresight. The answer is 
simple: As fiscal revenues  shrank, the payoff of  becoming the “leader”  and 
displacing the other group became greater than the payoff of retaining the sta- 
tus quo. Thus the implicit agreement not to take any action against the other 
group was not sustainable anymore, and was broken by the parastatal elite with 
the expropriation of  the banks. For the private sector the expected payoff of 
matching  by  supporting  trade  liberalization  was  greater  than  the  expected 
value of  not liberalizing and becoming  the follower (with the risk of being 
further expropriated  by  the  leader).  Therefore,  the  private  elite  decided  to 
match the move by the parastatal elite. 
The result  was that both  groups lost their power, giving autonomy to the 
government to implement further reforms. Thus the de la Madrid administra- 
tion was able to implement the whole package of reforms that had been consid- 
ered necessary  since the late sixties. Foreign  trade liberalization was com- 
pleted,  the privatization  and deregulation  processes  were  initiated,  and  the 
primary fiscal balance, which had been in deficit during the last decade, was 
transformed into a surplus. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the evolution of the Mexi- 
can terms of trade and of the primary fiscal surplus. As can be seen, the reforms 
of  1983-87  coincided with the sharp decline in the terms of trade. We might 
also note the sharp swing in the primary fiscal balance, which was transformed 
into a surplus in 1983 and remains positive. 
In the political arena, the private sector reacted to trade liberalization partly 
by  becoming more active in party politics.  This broke the pattern  of lack of 
political competition involving private interests noted by Skidmore and Smith 
(1  984). According to Maxfield and Anzaldua (1987), before 1982 an implicit 
agreement had obliged businessmen to stay out of party politics, while in re- 
turn the government promised to ensure a profitable investment ~limate.~  The 
bank nationalization of  1982 dealt a blow to this accord and induced a struc- 
tural shift. Since then some businessmen became involved in electoral politics 
by  supporting Partido Acci6n Nacional  (PAN), an opposition party from the 
right, and by running as candidates of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI), the party in power. For example, in the presidential elections of  1988, 
the candidate of the PAN was Clouthier, a former member of PRI who was the 
leader of the business association when the banks were expropriated. 
Some members of the parastatal sector reacted by splitting from the PRI a 
few months before the presidential elections of  1988. Combining with leftist 
parties,  a group headed by Cuauhtemoc C~denas  and Porfirio Munoz Led0 
3. For an insightful analysis of  the Mexican political system, see Cosio Villegas (1972). 62  Aaron Tornell 
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Fig. 2.2  Revenues and expenditures of the Mexican government 
formed the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) and obtained a third 
of  the votes.  Ck-denas is the son of  the former president  who founded the 
modern PRI, and was the manager of the Sicarsa steel plant (built during the 
seventies) and a governor of the state of Michoacan. Munoz Led0 was a cabinet 
minister and head of the PRI. 
2.3  The Model 
I present a two-period model where, under the status quo, all rent-seeking 
groups have common access to fiscal revenue. During good times none of the 
groups has incentives to change the status quo, while during bad times, it is 
optimal for each group to incur the costs necessary  to bar the other groups 63  Economic Crises: Necessary for Trade Liberalization, Fiscal Reform? 
from access to fiscal revenue. The model contains three  ingredients: rent- 
seeking groups that compete to appropriate fiscal revenue; a sector that is not 
organized politically, that is the source of fiscal revenue; and a rule describing 
how one group can bar another group from access to fiscal revenue. There is 
neither capital accumulation nor depreciation in the modeL4 
The rent-seeking sector is composed of two groups (a and b), which live for 
two periods and which produce a consumption good that is traded internation- 
ally and is the numeraire. This good is produced using capital and a variable 
input provided by the government at a subsidized price. The objective of each 
group is to maximize the present value of its profits. For each period the profits 
of group i are given by 
(1)  .rr(g,, z) = gy: -  zg,,  o<p51,  y>o, 
where g, is the amount of government input used by  group i, z is the unit price 
of this input, and k, is the capital stock of group i.  The g’s may also have a more 
indirect interpretation as import tariffs. In this case, z would represent bribes 
to the bureaucracy that administers trade policy or patronage payments to poli- 
ticians. 
Setting up the problem in this way  captures the fact that in many countries 
fiscal transfers to rent-seeking groups take the form of government inputs, such 
as electricity, gas, and soft credit, provided at subsidized rates. For instance, in 
the case of Mexico, transfers from the federal government to the national elec- 
tric utility (in order to sell cheap electricity) represented 0.3% of GDP in 1971 
(when President Echevem’a  took office), 0.5% in  1977, and  1.7% in  1983, 
(when President L6pez Portillo left office). At  present, following the fiscal 
reform, these subsidies represent only around 0.1 % of GDP. 
Next, we will describe the nonorganized sector, which is the source of fiscal 
revenue. This sector is composed of  investors that live for only one period. 
During each period, the representative investor is born with an endowment of 
W units of the consumption good. She can invest it abroad and receive a fixed 
tax-free rate of return  I;  or she can invest it domestically to produce a good 
that is not consumed domestically, using a decreasing returns technology. The 
government cannot tax foreign source income. Thus the investor must pay only 
taxes equal to a proportion T  of  the profits on her domestic investment. The 
investor spends all of  her after-tax income on the importable consumption 
good. 
Since the exportable good is produced using the consumption good as the 
only input, it follows that the representative investor has an after-tax income 
equal to 
(2)  Y=[l-T]pWoL+[l  +r][w-W],  o<(Y<1, 
4.  In Tornell (1992),  I characterize the evolution of a similar economy, in which there is capital 
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where T is the tax rate, w is the amount of  working capital invested domesti- 
cally, and p represents the terms of trade (i.e., the price of the exportable good 
produced by the nonorganized sector, in terms of the importable consumption 
good). If instead  the  nonorganized  sector produced  the consumption  good, 
then p  would be a shift parameter measuring the profitability of investing do- 
mestically. 
Lastly,  we  consider  the  government.  It produces  the  input used  by  rent- 
seeking groups at a cost of one in terms of the consumption good. However, it 
sells this input at z < 1. To cover the costs, the government collects taxes from 
the nonorganized  sector. I assume that the government cannot issue debt, so 
that the fiscal budget has to be balanced during each period. I also assume that 
payments made by rent-seeking groups for government inputs are not used to 
cover the fiscal budget. They are made for purposes of patronage or corruption. 
It follows then that 
(3) 
where T(t)  is total fiscal revenue during period t. 
The objective of the government is to maximize income in the nonorganized 
sector. Thus, if it were unconstrained,  it would set g,,  g,,,  and T  equal to zero 
during each period. However, the government’s power is limited by the power 
of rent-seeking  groups. I will consider three possible regimes under which T 
is determined: 
1.  “Common access”: under this regime the government is powerless, and 
both groups have equal power. The tax rate is set equal to the revenue maximiz- 
ing level (?).5 
2.  “Leader-follower”:  under this regime all power  is concentrated  in one 
group, “the leader.” The government and the other group (“the follower”) are 
powerless. As in the previous regime, T  is set equal to ?. 
3.  “Autonomous”:  under this regime both groups are weak. The only con- 
straint faced by the government is to transfer to the groups a small proportion 
1  (< .i)  of the nonorganized sector’s domestic income. 
Tax rates are derived assuming the following  sequence of events. During 
each period, conditional on p(t)  and on the prevalent regime, the government 
sets T(t). Then, conditional  on p(t)  and ~(t),  investors choose w(t)  and each 
group is allocated  its respective  share of  T(p(t)),  g,(t) and g,(t). Under the 
leader-follower  and common access regimes, the government sets T so as to 
maximize tax revenues, taking as given that the representative investor allo- 
cates her working capital so as to equalize after-tax rates of  return. I show in 
the appendix that tax revenue is maximized  at ? = 1 -  a.  Therefore,  under 
these regimes the tax revenue function is 
5. Aizenman (1992) and Tornell and Velasco (1992) analyze the common access regime in a 
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(4)  ?(p) =  pG(?(p),  p)"?(p) = Bp""-"),  B > 0. 
Under the autonomous regime, the government sets T = 7 < 1 -a.  Thus 
(5)  T,(p)  =  PW(?, P)"?, 
Since T(p,  T) is concave in T (see equation [A3]),  and since 7 < 1 -  a,  it fol- 
lows that f(p)  >  To&)  for all p. 
Consider the following two-stage game between both rent-seeking groups. 
In the first stage, both groups have common access to fiscal revenue. At time 
0, after p(0)  and p(1) are revealed and after T(O),  g,(O),  and g,(O)  are chosen, 
each group decides whether or not to lose a proportion q of its profits, in order 
to eliminate the access to fiscal revenue that the other group will have at time 
1. In the second stage, ~(l),  ga(l),  and g,(1) are chosen.6 
The preceding  sequence of moves is meant  to capture the two effects of 
trade liberalization that I identified in the introduction. To see this, let the two 
groups be the import-competing elite and the parastatal elite. On the one hand, 
the efficiency effect of trade liberalization implies that productive factors must 
be reallocated. This entails a short-run cost to the import-competing elite. On 
the other hand, the discipline effect of trade liberalization implies a reduction 
in the ability of the parastatal elite to expropriate the assets of  other groups in 
the future. 
There are three possible outcomes in this game. 
1. Status quo: neither group incurs the cost qn,  and common access to fiscal 
revenue prevails. 
2. Matching: both groups incur the cost qn, both lose their power, and a 
shift to the autonomous regime takes place. 
3. Leader-follower: one group incurs the cost qn and becomes the leader, 
while the other group does not and becomes the follower. The leader gets the 
government input for free, and it can expropriate all the wealth of the follower. 
Next, I determine the equilibrium levels of g, and g,.  To make precise the 
idea that rent-seeking groups are inefficient in production, and that the govern- 
ment subsidizes them through low input prices, I make two assumptions that 
hold for all regimes and for all realizations of p. First, neither group finds it 
profitable  to buy an extra unit of the input at a price of  one (recall that the 
inputs' marginal cost of production is one). Second, there exists an excess de- 
mand for the government input at the price z. Since  p takes values in the inter- 
val k,  p],  since the leader gets the government input for free, and since p I  1, 
these conditions hold if and only if 
6. The  same results could be obtained if the cost was a proportion q of  revenues, or of  the 
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I assume that in the case of the autonomous and the common access regimes 
half of  total  fiscal revenue is allocated to each group. Condition (6) implies 
that it is not optimal for any group to buy the input at its market price. Conse- 
quently, we have that the g's  are given by 
(7)  &(PI = QPh  gJP) = 0,  gcu,,  = w23  L,,,  = T,,,(P)/2. 
To determine which of the three possible outcomes mentioned above will be 
equilibrium outcomes, I derive the payoffs associated with each. Using (1) and 
(7), the payoffs of the follower and the leader are 
(8)  F(p,) = d'(pflY2,z), 
and 
(9) 
where 6 is the discount factor. 
Thus the payoff of each group is 
(10)  SQ(p,, P,)  = ~(f(pJ2,  z) + 8d'(plY2,  z). 
Lastly, in the matching case, both  groups incur the short-run cost, and their 
power to set the tax rate is eliminated. The payoff of each group is 
(11) 
L(p,, PI)  = [1 -  q17T(?-(P,p9  z) + 6d-(P,)?  01, 
Under the status quo, the common access regime prevails in both periods. 
MP,, PI) = [1 -  dd-(P")/2,  2) + WTU,(P,)/2,  z). 
In order to characterize the Nash equilibria of the game, it is useful to repre- 
sent it in the following strategic form, 
where I  stands for incurring the short-run cost, NI for not incurring it, h  for 
matching, S for status quo, F for follower, and L for leader. The first and second 
terms in parentheses are the payoffs to groups a and b, respectively; they are 
given by equations (8)-( 11). 
The size of L relative to S and the size of M relative to F determine which 
of the three possible outcomes (status quo, leader-follower, or matching) will 
be an equilibrium outcome. For instance, if L I  S  and M 1  E the unique Nash 
equilibrium is matching (i.e., that both groups incur the short-run cost 4).  On 
the one hand, given that group a incurs the cost, the best response of group b 
is to match because the payoff of matching is greater than that of becoming 
the follower. On the other hand, regardless of group b's  action, group a finds it 
profitable to incur the cost. It either gets L, which is greater than S if b does 67  Economic Crises: Necessary for Trade Liberalization, Fiscal Reform? 
not move, or M, which is greater than F if b moves. For future reference, the 
equilibrium outcomes are summarized here. 
Payofs  Equilibrium Outcomes 
L 2  S  M 2  F  shift to autonomous regime 
L < S  M 2  F  status quo prevails, or 
M <  F  shift to leader-follower regime 
shift to autonomous regime 
status quo prevails  M <  F 
As can be seen in equations (8)-( 1  l), the relative sizes of the payoffs depend 
on the values of po  and p,.  In order to address the issue of when trade liberaliza- 
tion will take place, I let po  vary while keepingp, constant. I will show that for 
sufficiently small po the only equilibrium outcome is matching (i.e., a shift to 
the autonomous regime), while for sufficiently high po  the only equilibrium 
outcome is the status quo. That is, trade liberalization is an equilibrium out- 
come during bad times, but not during good times. 
The key to this result is that, as po  goes up, the value of remaining in the 
status quo increases more rapidly than the value of becoming the leader, and 
the value of following increases more rapidly than the value of matching. To 
illustrate we use figure 2.3, which depicts the payoffs E  L, M, and S as func- 
tions of po  (p,  is held constant). All payoffs are increasing in po  because higher 
terms of  trade increase the profitability  for the nonorganized sector to invest 
domestically. This in turn increases total tax collection, and thus increases gov- 
ernment  subsidies at time 0. The higher  the government subsidies are, the 
higher the profits of rent-seeking groups are under each regime. 
To see why the payoff function of leading is flatter than that of  the status 
quo, note that at time 0 the leader loses a share q of its profits  (profits are 
[  1 -  q]~(0)),  while under the status quo no cost is incurred (profits are ~(0)). 
Thus an increase in p(0)  has a greater impact on the payoff of  the status quo 
than in the payoff of leading, because ~(0)  is increasing in p(0)  and because 
the future reward, in terms of a greater share of government subsidies, remains 
unchanged  (p(1) is fixed).  In  other words,  at very  low  levels  of  p(0)  it is 
“cheap” to engage in nonproductive activities in order to induce change. 
As can be seen in figure 2.3, during normal times (p(0)  =  p)  the status quo 
is preferred to leading and following is preferred to matching. Thus at p  the 
status  quo  is  the  only  equilibrium  outcome.  However,  during  bad  times 
(p(0)  5  p‘)  the only equilibrium  outcome is matching. In this equilibrium, 
both groups lose Tq  at t = 0 and both lose their access to fiscal revenue. Dur- 
ing good times (p(0)  >  p”),  the only equilibrium outcome is the status quo. I 
analyze the case in which p(0)  is in (p’,  p”]  in the next section.’ 
7. There is another case in whichp’ >  p‘.  In this case matching is the only equilibrium outcome 
for p(0) <  p”, leader-follower is the only equilibrium outcome for p(0)  E (p”,  p’],  and the status 
quo is the only equilibrium outcome for p(0)  >  p’. 68  Aaron Tornell 
I  i  + Po 
P’  P”  P 
Fig. 2.3  Pair of functions 
2.4  Does the Government Matter in This Model? 
Up to now we have assumed that under the status quo interest groups can 
block any government decision. While maintaining this assumption, let us now 
suppose that the government has the ability to influence a group’s expectations 
concerning the move that the other group will make. Let us define “political 
manipulation” as the act of influencing these expectations. It follows that polit- 
ical manipulation matters when there are multiple Nash equilibria in the game 
played by  interest groups. In  this case there is room  for the government to 
induce interest groups to end up in the Nash equilibrium that is best for the 
economy as a whole, although it may be bad for the interest groups. 
To illustrate this point, suppose that in the status quo both groups have com- 
mon access to fiscal revenue, and consider the case in which p(0)  is between 
pr  and p”.  In this case the value of remaining in the status quo is greater than 
that of becoming the leader, and the value of matching is greater than that of 
following. Therefore, there are two Nash equilibria: In the first, neither group 
incurs the short-run cost p,  and the status quo prevails. In the second, both 
groups incur the cost, and there is a shift to the autonomous regime.  Both 
groups are better off under the first equilibrium. However, the second equilib- 
rium is sustained by the fear of each group that the other group will make the 
move. In this case, the role of political manipulation would be to bring about 
the second equilibrium. That is, the government would  induce expectations 
among groups, that the other group will make the move. This is likely to be a 
difficult task for the government because the status quo is the Pareto-superior 
outcome. 
The role of political manipulation as defined above is limited to this case. If 
po  were outside the interval (p’,  p”) or if pr  were greater than pIr,  there would 
be a unique Nash equilibrium, as is clear from figure 2.3. Therefore, in these 
cases the outcome is independent of the government’s political manipulation. 
I should note that in the model we are considering groups that move simulta- 
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follow more complicated  strategies that depend on the history  of  the game. 
However, to the extent that there exists an advantage to moving first, the results 
of this paper should remain valid. 
2.5  Reversion of the Reforms and Policy Implications 
A question often asked is whether or not trade liberalization and fiscal re- 
form will  outlast the crisis that generated them, or whether there will be  a 
reversion to the old ways if good times return. 
In  the case of Mexico, beginning  in  1989, the wind  started to blow  in a 
favorable direction. There was a 35% reduction in foreign debt, exports were 
more diversified than in  1982, and financial capital started to flow in again. 
The reforms initiated by President de la Madrid were not undone, however, but 
were deepened to an extent that was considered impossible a few years back: 
NAFTA has been signed, all the big companies except for oil, electricity, and 
railroads have been privatized,  and a radical deregulation program  has been 
implemented, eliminating many monopolies and sources of corruption. 
We can analyze the reversion of reform using a model similar to the one in 
section 2.3. Suppose that the autonomous regime prevails under the status quo 
(i.e., rent-seeking groups do not have access to fiscal revenue and T = z), and 
consider the following two-stage game: In the first stage, after p(0)  and p(  1) 
are announced, and after T(O), g,(O),  and g,(O)  are chosen, each group decides 
whether or not to incur a loss q'~r(T~,,(p,,)/2,  z)  at time 0, in order to become 
more powerful at time 1. In the second stage, T( l),  go( l),  and g,(  1) are chosen. 
Again, there are three possible outcomes. 
1. Only one group incurs the loss, and it becomes the leader. Thus the other 
group becomes the follower. 
2.  Both groups incur the loss, and both get common access to fiscal revenue. 
3.  Neither group incurs the loss, and the status quo prevails. 
As in section 2.3, under the common access regime g, = ?  (p)/2, and under 
the leader-follower regime g,  = 0 and g, = ?(p). Therefore, the payoffs of the 
leader and the follower are 
(12) 
and 
= [1 -  q'1~(Tu,(p")/2,  z) + W?(p,),  O), 
(13)  F = n(T"uf(Po)>  z). 
Under the status quo, the autonomous regime prevails in both periods. Thus 
the payoff of  each group is 
(14)  s  = T(Tau,(Po)/2,  z) + S.rr(Tu,(PIY2,  z). 
M = [l -  q'la(Tou,(p0)/2,  z) + S7F(?(p1)/2,  z). 
Lastly, in the matching case the payoff of each group is 
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In terms of this model, a reform is not undone if the status quo is the only 
equilibrium outcome. Recall that this is the case if and only if  the status quo 
is preferred to leading, and following is preferred to matching.  Subtracting 
(14) from (12) and (1  3) from (IS), L -  S and M -  F are increasing in p( 1) and 
decreasing in p(0).  Thus, at high levels of p(l), the status quo ceases to be 
an equilibrium outcome. There is a shift to common access or to the leader- 
follower regime. 
Let us now consider the policy implications of this model. Suppose that the 
costs of  getting access to fiscal revenues  (4’) can be affected by the govern- 
ment. Since L -  S and M -  F are decreasing in q’, it follows that, if  during 
the period that the government enjoys autonomy it implements policies that 
lead q’  to increase at a faster rate than potential fiscal revenue, then the likeli- 
hood of a reversion to the old system of privileges diminishes. On the contrary, 
if potential fiscal revenue were to grow faster than q’, the likelihood of a failed 
reform would increase because of  the heightened temptation of the groups to 
gain back their old privileges. 
We might identify policies that alter q’  as those that have to do with struc- 
tural and judicial reform. For instance, signing a free trade agreement limits 
the possibility that groups will gain back import protection or production sub- 
sidies.  Eliminating  complicated  regulations,  introducing  clear  bankruptcy 
laws, and creating an independent judicial system will make the reestablish- 
ment of  a patronage network  much more expensive, since there will be no 
room for “interpretation  of the law.” 
Increases in the parameter p can be identified with events that increase the 
ability of the government to obtain more fiscal revenue or that allow the gov- 
ernment to borrow more. These events include an increase in foreign aid, dis- 
coveries of natural  resources such as oil, and improvements in the terms of 
trade. These events might increase the cost a rent-seeking group is willing to 
pay in order to get access to this enlarged source of revenue. 
For instance, if after a crisis foreign aid were granted, with no conditions of 
change in the regulatory framework or in the subsidization scheme, then the 
temptation of rent-seeking groups to gain back their old privileges would in- 
crease. Thus, foreign aid packages might have the unintended effect of  pre- 
venting growth-enhancing structural change. 
2.6  Conclusions 
In Mexico, since the late sixties it became evident that the protectionist de- 
velopment strategy was not beneficial for the country anymore. However, trade 
liberalization did not take place until 1985, and the badly needed fiscal reform 
did not take place until 1989. 
In this paper, I offer an explanation of why these reforms were delayed until 
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when the country  could afford the costs associated  with these reforms.  My 
premise is that welfare-improving reforms for the country can be blocked by 
powerful interest groups that stand to lose from these reforms. 
The interest groups that blocked the reforms during the seventies were the 
private import-competing elite and the parastatal elite. In the seventies, both 
groups were interested in keeping the status quo. Since fiscal resources were 
plentiful, both groups enjoyed high subsidies, which kept the profitability of 
their fixed assets at a high level. Under these circumstances, it was not profit- 
able for either group to redirect its assets away from productive activities in 
order to reduce the power of the other group and to guarantee for itself a greater 
share of fiscal revenue. Hence the status quo prevailed. 
The equilibrium between these two powerful groups broke down when the 
debt crisis erupted in  1982, since the government could no longer maintain 
high levels of subsidies. The struggle between interest groups took place in the 
spheres of private bank expropriation  and trade liberalization. The short-run 
costs of trade liberalization were the adjustment costs implied by the efficiency 
effects of free trade. The private elite benefited because the power of the para- 
statal elite to expropriate and obtain studies was reduced. This mutual weaken- 
ing gave temporary autonomy to the government to implement a fiscal reform. 
Appendix A 
Here I derive the fiscal revenue function (4). During each period, given the 
realization of p(t)  and the tax rate ~(t),  the representative investor maximizes 
equation (2) by allocating her working capital so as to equalize after-tax rates 
of return: 
(All  p[1 -  7]aG--l = 1 + I: 
In order to derive the fiscal revenue function, I further assume that the size 
of the investors'  population is one. Thus, from (Al), 
1 
7  l+r" 
(A2)T(7, pj = p~G(7,  p)" =  A =  > 0, 
where T is total  fiscal  revenue.  Under the common access  and the leader- 
follower regimes, the tax rate is set so as to maximize tax revenue. The first 
and second order conditions are 72  Aaron Tornell 
and 
Ll-a  1-7  J’ 
Since the solution to (A3) is 7 = 1 -  a,  and since T(p,  T)  is concave in 7, 
the fiscal revenue function under the leader-follower and the common access 
regimes is obtained by substituting T = 1 -  01  in (A2). 
Appendix B 





























































Financial  Primary  Total  Total  Parastatal 
Balance  Balance  Revenue  Expenditure  Expenditure 
-0.8  0 
-1.1  -0.2 
-2.  I  -0.8 
-1.9  -0.7 
-2.0  -0.7 
-3.4  -  1.3 
-2.3  -0.4 
-4.5  -2.2 
-6.3  -3.5 
-6.7  -3.7 
-9.3  -6.0 
-9.1  -4.6 
-5.3  -2.2 
-6.2  -2.2 
-7.1  -2.7 
-7.5  -3.0 
-  14.1  -8.0 
-  16.9  -2.6 
-8.5  4.0 
-8.5  4.2 
-9.6  3.9 
-  16.9  2.5 
-18.1  5.7 
-  12.5  8.1 
-5.6  3.6 
-  1.0  10.6 
-1.5  5.6 
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Comment  Kenneth A. Froot 
Aaron  Tornell has written  a thought-provoking  paper  about the  forces that 
opened the way for the Mexican liberalization of  the 1980s. How were Presi- 
dents de la Madrid and Salinas able to overcome the political Achilles’ heel of 
trade liberalizations-obtaining  the backing of import-competing sectors-in 
their pursuit of openness? This is the question that Tornell asks. His approach 
is helpful in understanding how governments  might gain consensus for pro- 
grams that nevertheless impose substantial costs on powerful interest groups. 
I want to make two points in this comment. First, I want to summarize what 
makes Tomell’s model and argument work. Second, I want to identify and elab- 
orate on another kind of  explanation for how reforms can proceed and how a 
new consensus is achieved. 
Kenneth  A. Froot  is  professor of  business administration at  Harvard University’s Graduate 
School of Business and a research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 74  Aaron Tornell 
Tornell’s model  features two private  sector (i.e., maximizing) groups that 
compete to receive  government  subsidies. Under  the preliberalized  regime, 
these groups cooperatively share a fixed pie of government subsidies. However, 
either group has the option of deviating from this cooperative arrangement. By 
doing so, the deviating group gains access to the entire (fixed) pie of govern- 
ment subsidies in thefuture,  taking for itself the future subsidies of the other 
group. The cost of doing this is that the deviating group loses a fraction of its 
current,  shared subsidies. This cost can be thought of as the adjustment cost 
imposed on an import-competing  sector as the result of  a liberalization pro- 
gram. So, if this  group decides to support liberalization, it loses protection 
today, but gains sole access to large subsidies tomorrow. Provided that the net 
costs of the liberalization are temporary, the import-competing sector is willing 
to support it. Because the two groups play in a noncooperative game, this argu- 
ment makes both groups more willing to support change over the preliberalized 
status quo. 
This argument has two basic features. First, it looks at the liberalization 
process as redistributive, not expansionary, in the long run. Second, it has the 
government playing a relatively  unimportant role in initiating  the liberaliza- 
tion. Tornell has done this in order to emphasize the interplay between oppos- 
ing rent-seeking groups. And I agree that this is an important effect that deter- 
mines the strategic behavior of interest groups. Nevertheless, I wonder whether 
import-competing groups generally allow liberalizations to occur because they 
want to leapfrog over (or avoid being leapfrogged by) another subsidy-seeking 
group. That is, I wonder whether liberalizations actually evolve out of a strate- 
gic interaction between private interest groups with only a minimal role for 
government. 
My own reaction is that, to understand the liberalization process, one must 
first say something about why import-competing sectors come to be subsidized 
in the first place. One explanation is that subsidies are created by governments 
that have output and employment objectives that are not fully consistent with 
economic efficiency. Looking around the world, one can find many apparent 
examples  of  such  objectives-governments  (including  that  of  the  United 
States) routinely  protect sunset sectors (in the United States, steel and foot- 
wear) from international competition, bail out large failing companies (such 
as Chrysler), and even forestall the collapse of large industries (such as that of 
the S&Ls). Governments are frequently willing to spend substantial resources 
on  these  less-than-efficient  objectives.  Liberalization-especially  in  Latin 
American countries,  and certainly in eastern Europe  and  the former  Soviet 
republics-in  my view follows when there is a consensus that these objectives 
are too costly to pursue. That is, trade liberalizations occur when the govern- 
ment can no longer afford protection. Note that consensus under this story can 
evolve because reform substantially increases efficiency over that of the highly 
distortionary, status quo policies. 
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along. I think one answer is that, in these circumstances, the status quo cannot 
be maintained and is simply not an option at all. Such sectors do not view this 
as a choice between liberalization and the status quo, but between liberaliza- 
tion and something much worse, perhaps social unrest or political upheaval. 
And in many cases-think  of  the reforms  in eastern Europe-such  sectors 
really have little input into the reform decisions, which are broader in scope 
and much more far-reaching. 
A second answer to why the import-competing sector would go along with 
liberalization involves growth. Preliberalized economies are often stagnating 
or contracting. The import-competing sector thus must choose between a pro- 
tected, but shrinking, market versus a more open, but growing, market. It is 
not obvious that additional incentives are needed to get them to go along with 
liberalization measures. 
Finally, recall that most liberalization programs include a healthy dose of 
exchange rate depreciation. Often trade  protection  has evolved partly  in re- 
sponse to an overvalued currency. And liberalization is often a rationalization 
of the price structure in the economy, allowing relative prices to better reflect 
international  standards.  Because  intermediate  goods  are often  taxed,  some 
import-competing  sectors may  actually be  taxed  rather than  protected  prior 
to liberalization. 
In the end, both Tornell’s story and the more standard one I suggest can rely 
on a crisis to motivate the policy  switch. In Tornell’s model, the crisis made 
both sectors more interested in pursuing government subsidies (such other rev- 
enues were harder to come by). In the standard story, the crisis comes when 
the government’s antiefficiency goals are literally bankrupting the country, be- 
coming too costly to finance in the domestic and international capital markets, 
and eroding the tax base through slow growth. As Tornell says, in the case of 
Mexico in the 1980s, there are surely elements of both. This Page Intentionally Left Blank